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  In an attempt to describe how cultural Cold War was waged in Japan, this article reviews how 
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, William Appleman Williams’ classic book was received in this 
country. The article not only aims to illuminate the impact that Williams made on Japanese scholars 
of American studies, but also attempts to assess his contributions to deepening an understanding of 
American history. It also seeks to understand the reasons why the impact of his scholarship was 
limited only to a small group of Japanese scholars. Recently American diplomatic historian Thomas 
J. McCormick called upon his colleagues “to focus . . . on some concerted and constructive thought 
about what kind of alternative to offer in its place.” 1） This article intends to be a part of a response 
to his call.
Changing Intellectual Climate in Postwar Japan2）
  From 1945 to 1960, the period that coincides with and extends several years beyond the U.S. 
occupation of Japan, Japanese intellectuals tackled three related and outstanding issues — the de-
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〈要約〉
　本稿は，1960年代から 70年代のアメリカ外交史学会に多大の影響を及ぼした
「ニュー・レフト」修正史学，その生みの親である歴史家ウィリアム・A・ウィリアムズ
の代表作『アメリカ外交の悲劇』（1959年）が，日本のアメリカ研究者にいかに受けとめ
られ，どのような影響を及ぼしたのか，あるいは及ぼさなかったかを分析し，日本におけ
る文化冷戦の実態を明らかにする試論である。まず，ウィリアムズの歴史哲学，研究手法，
ならびにアメリカ史観を要約した後，戦後期を 1940年代後半から 50年代，1950年代後
半から 60年代前半，1960年代後半から 70年代に 4区分し，各時期におけるリベラル史
家とマルクス主義史家のウィリアムズ史学への対応を検討する。合衆国の史学会における
絶大なる存在感とそれへの影響とは対照的に，日本におけるウィリアムズ史学の影響は，
一部の研究者を例外として，歴史家の思想的立場の違いにもかかわらず，限られたもので
あった。その理由として，一つは，ウィリアムズの歴史研究方法のいくつかの問題点，二
つは，ウィリアムズのキリスト教的人道主義に基づく社会改革思想が日本の研究者に必ず
しも十分に理解されたとは言えず，そのために彼の思想が日本の文化的土壌に根付きにく
かったこと，三つは，ベトナム戦争の終結などが考えられる。
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militarization, modernization, and democratization of their country. To democratize the nation by 
abolishing the remaining vestiges of feudalism, they attached great importance not only to the liqui-
dation of the semi-feudal mode of production, but also to the humanistic aspects of modernization 
which included the liberation of the people from authoritarianism, the patriarchal family system, 
and the establishment of civil and political freedom for the people. The word modernization was a 
neutral concept that connoted social and cultural changes that took place during a transition from 
pre-modernity to modernity. But immediately after the war, scholars often used modernization and 
democratization interchangeably.
  At the same time, Marxism was enormously influential among Japanese intellectuals in the ear-
ly years of the U.S. occupation. It had a great ideological appeal to many of them, not only because 
the pre-war doctrine of unquestioned allegiance, the religion of acquiescence, and the ideology of 
the power state were all discredited, but also Marxism seemed to be the only extant comprehensive 
body of thought that could help the Japanese find answers to all the problems they faced at that 
time. Moreover, the Japan Communist Party （hereafter JCP）, many of whose members had 
maintained an anti-war position consistently and steadfastly and had refused ideological conversion 
even when they were jailed during the war, seemed to be the only political party worthy of respect. 
Therefore, orthodox Marxists commanded authority and great respect from a large segment of the 
Japanese population.3）
  Postwar intellectuals consisted of two distinct groups. One group was made up of historians 
and social scientists. They were sometimes called liberal modernists. They pursued their studies 
with a Weberian approach. The other group consisting of orthodox Marxists and leftists carried on 
studies from a Marxian perspective.4） The latter outnumbered the former during the Occupation.
  Meanwhile, liberal modernists were anxious to democratize the country. Their ultimate goal 
was to establish a modern civil society in a non-revolutionary way. They regarded a citizen with a 
sense of responsibility and a strong moral fiber as an agent for social change. They attached a spe-
cial importance to non-material factors, notably the cultural and psychological aspects of moderniza-
tion, such as ethos, social consciousness, and individualism, which they found deplorably lacking in 
the Japanese. While they employed a comparative approach that set Japanese history against 
European history, they used the dichotomy of feudalism and modernism as an analytical 
framework.5）
  Orthodox Marxists shared the liberal modernists’ view that Japan needed to be democratized, 
but they believed that democratization was only a half-way step to achieve their ultimate goal which 
was to bring about a socialist revolution in their country.6） Marxists regarded the working class as 
an agent for social change, and they made natural allies of the JCP. They were primarily preoccupied 
with the structural reform of Japanese society. Leftwing intellectuals used the approach of class 
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analysis and holistically addressed the structural problems of Japanese capitalism. Like liberal mod-
ernists, leftist scholars stressed the backwardness of Japan’s capitalist development.
  Scholars, be they liberals or Marxists, had a goal in common, although their ultimate goal and 
approach to achieve it differed significantly. They emphasized the importance of obtaining state 
power as the indispensable intermediate achievement on the road to their ultimate goals.7） Given 
the situation, they shared a strong sense of mission and a great interest in democratization in terms 
of man and society.
  As early as 1945, liberals and Marxists formed a united front in order to make a new Japan gen-
uinely democratic. In early 1948, the representatives of the two groups gathered together and had a 
roundtable discussion to find ways to establish a close rapport with each other and cooperate for 
the common cause.8） Soon, however, it turned out that forming a united front was easier said than 
done. Notwithstanding their rhetoric, most orthodox Marxists stood haughtily aloof from the de-
pressed multitudes who were struggling to survive. Because of the elitism and self-righteousness of 
the Marxists, on the one hand, and liberals’ deep-seated suspicions of Marxists’ ulterior motives, on 
the other, both liberals and Marxists discovered how difficult it was to split the difference between 
them. The relations between them deteriorated as the Cold War confrontation loomed larger and 
became more serious.9） The situation became much worse in 1948‒1949, when the US government 
adopted the policy of the so-called “reverse course” and shifted the priority of Occupation objectives 
to the economic recovery of Japan. As a result, a cultural Cold War set in. As enthusiasm for keep-
ing a united front afloat waned, so did the prospect of scholars to bring Karl Marx, Max Weber, and 
even Sigmund Freud all into one single analytical framework. By 1950, those scholars discontinued 
their dialogue and chose to go in separate directions. The short-lived mirage of a united front dissi-
pated into thin air. It was in this cultural context that Japanese scholars pursued American studies 
after the war.
Late 1940’s－ 1950’s
  From the late 1940’s through the 1950’s, liberal scholars studied the American Revolution, pos-
iting that America would serve Japan as a model democracy.10） They aimed to utilize the knowledge 
of American history gleaned from their research in hope to develop a full-fledged modern personali-
ty, as well as to establish a modern, democratic, civil society in postwar Japan. Liberal scholars as-
siduously read Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and Louis Hartz’s Liberal Tradition in 
America. They were impressed with the strength of Americanism that unified a nation of diverse 
ethnicities.11） Japanese liberals were annoyed by McCarthyism and were embarrassed by the dis-
crepancy between American ideals and realities, but they placed a special emphasis on the bright 
and forward-looking aspects of the United States.
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  On the other hand, scholars on the left pursued American studies from a Marxian perspec-
tive.12） Orthodox Marxists drew on the Marxist-Leninist theory of historical materialism as a guid-
ing frame of reference. While some economic historians analyzed the structure of American capital-
ism, others focused on American imperialism of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century. 
They studied their subjects on the basis of the Hobson-Lenin paradigm that defined imperialism as 
“the highest stage of capitalism.”13） Japanese leftists industriously read the works of their American 
counterparts, such as those of Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, and Leo Huberman.14） Leftist scholars 
emphasized the seamy side of American society. They believed that their negative image of 
America was vindicated by America’s anti-communist campaign at home and abroad, particularly 
McCarthyism, which ran amuck in the United States during the early 1950’s.
  But the internal struggles within the JCP leadership and its subsequent abrupt change in policy 
in 1955 caused great confusion among leftwing scholars, contributing to a relative decline in the au-
thority and influence of Marxism. The decline was accelerated further by de-Stalinization in 
Moscow in the following year. Since then, nothing seemed to be able to halt or reverse the steady 
decline of Marxism.
  Thus, the Japanese had a split image of the United States during those years. One was a for-
ward-looking image of America — a nation of liberal democracy that was symbolized by a frontier 
line moving westward constantly until the end of the nineteenth century. The other was a horrible 
image of America — an aggressive imperialist nation into which the United States transmogrified it-
self after the Spanish-American War of 1898. The Japanese historians depicted the first half of 
American history as the history of democracy, while describing the second half as the history of im-
perialism. They continued to hold such a divided image of America, positive and negative, sitting 
side by side in the minds of Japanese historians.
Late 1950’s－ First Half of the 1960’s
  American studies in Japan became polarized sharply from the late 1950’s through the first half 
of the 1960’s. This period coincided with the beginning of Japan’s spectacular economic growth 
through rapid industrialization. This economic growth transformed Japan into an affluent and tech-
nocratic society and brought with it a corrosive effect on people’s consciousness, particularly the 
consciousness of the working people. Moreover, social contradictions which accompanied the high 
rate of economic growth presented themselves in such forms as human alienation and environmen-
tal destruction.
  On the other hand, the new U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 served as a catalyst to intensify 
the cultural Cold War in Japan. Japanese nationalism and anti-American sentiment ran highest in 
1960 when the conservative Kishi government rammed the new security treaty through the Diet in 
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Tokyo. People, young and old, rose up in protest against the government and staged mass demon-
strations day after day.
  Against the background of this meteoric rise of a popular protest movement and a presumed 
Communist influence over it, liberal modernists launched an offensive against Marxism. Namely, 
they imported new social sciences from the United States and turned on the offensive against their 
rivals, the Marxists. The ideological weapon that liberals employed was modernization theory. This 
theory was invented primarily with the intention of replacing the previous concept of modernization 
with the notion of industrialization.15） Liberal scholars, influenced by modernization theory, reexam-
ined the general concepts and categories that Marxists had used and rejected the previous defini-
tion of modernization as too ideologically oriented.
  During the period of the second stage, the state of American studies in Japan changed little ex-
cept that it became polarized further as years elapsed into the latter part of the 1960’s. Most 
Japanese experts of America continued to hold a split image of the United States, as described earli-
er. It is worth noting that the present-day Japanese Association for American Studies was estab-
lished in January 1966 with a membership of approximately 200.16） It was primarily because a need 
was keenly felt to deepen a Japanese understanding of the United States and to keep the bilateral re-
lations cordial at a critical moment in the history of US-Japan relations. This academic organization 
became genuinely nation-wide, as compared with its predecessor formed in March 1947.17）
Second Half of the 1960’s－ the 1970’s
  As Japan entered the second half of the 1960’s and the 1970’s, the country found itself increas-
ingly incorporated deeper and deeper into the intricate web of America’s global strategy. Japan’s so-
called “subordinate independence” vis-à-vis the United States became so apparent in the eyes of 
many Japanese; it became a constant pain in their necks. Particularly, they grew uneasy about being 
involved indirectly in an America-made war as the United States was drawn deeper and deeper into 
the Vietnam War. Popular discontent with the lopsided US-Japan relationship and anxieties about 
military involvement in the Vietnam War grew and spread throughout the nation. The general sense 
of crisis exploded in the late 1960’s and the early 1970’s in such forms as campus riots and an anti-
Vietnam War and pro-peace movement.
  At the same time, Marxists became ideologically confounded by the split between the Soviet 
Union and China within the Communist world and the subsequent military skirmishes along the 
border between the two Communist giants. The Sino-Soviet exchange of scathing criticism con-
fused the rank and file of the JCP and scholars leaning toward Marxism, and contributed to the 
JCP’s internal split into two schools of thought. This division led to the rise of New Left radicalism 
in Japan.18） Of course, those events accelerated the further decline of Marxism in terms of authority 
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and influence, generating a general sense of crisis especially among a younger generation of 
scholars.
  By the 1970’s, Japanese intellectuals, both Marxist and non-Marxist, deepened their sense of 
crisis as the Vietnam War appeared to be being fought with no exit in sight. This critical situation 
seemed to keep asking every Japanese scholar the question of why he/she was studying American 
history.19） Liberals were doubtless perplexed by the chain of events at home and abroad, in particu-
lar, the rapid increase in the American military engagement in Vietnam. Notwithstanding the turn 
of events, liberals kept portraying an essentially positive picture of liberal democracy in America 
with a special emphasis on the progressive tradition of the United States.20） By that time, however, it 
was obvious that their image of liberal America was no longer able to explain adequately why the 
United States was fighting fiercely in Vietnam.21）
  It was in this social context that young historian Shimizu Tomohisa, one of the valued disciples 
of Williams’ introduced The Tragedy of American Diplomacy and other works to his country.22） 
Subsequently, American New Left revisionism came to be known to Japanese scholars.
Williams’ Way of Interpreting American History
  How did Japanese scholars receive Williams’ work? What part of Williams’ philosophy and 
methodology of history appealed to them? Before answering these questions, let us take a quick 
look at what Williams had to say in his classic book.
  First, Williams insisted that American history should be understood as a history of expansion 
and an empire. For most Japanese who had long been used to a liberal image of America, it must 
have been quite a shocking and eye-opening experience to them that Williams, who had weathered 
a storm of McCarthyism, put forth such radical views of American history.23）
  Williams used Weltanschauung, the idea of sociology of knowledge as a key concept in his 
study of history. Weltanschauung means the view of how the world works. According to this view, 
the world is organized in such a way that political, religious or cultural values （including economic 
criteria） are held to be crucial factors in decision-making.24）
  Williams stressed the importance of a frontier-expansionist worldview of American policy 
makers when he interpreted American history. He explained that they believed that the health 
of American liberal democracy and the general welfare depended on a continuously expanding 
frontier. In other words, America continued to solve social problems by means of expansion. 
Williams argued that this expansionist philosophy of history guided American leaders to build an 
American empire. The Americans developed another ideology which asserted that such expansion 
was, in fact, the agent of extending morality and well-being to the less fortunate of the world, 
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according to Williams.
  By dint of “the inner logic of all expansionist thought,” Williams insisted, “both opportunity and 
difficulty, good and evil, are externalized.” 25） While holding others responsible for American devel-
opment, wealth, and welfare, the Americans blamed other countries for America’s troubles and de-
monized them. In other words, the Americans evaded the problems and shifted the responsibility 
for their troubles to others abroad. Consequently, they failed to create a genuinely humane commu-
nity based on Christianity and socialism. Williams called on the American people to summon 
enough courage to accept “limits upon America’s freedom of action” and make new history by em-
barking on “an open door at home”.26） He was convinced that “realism goes nowhere unless it starts 
at home.” 27） Williams attached great importance to people’s perceptions of the world as an agent 
for social change. Unless Americans could break the chain of this traditional worldview of an 
aggressive and confrontational nature, he forewarned, this American expansionist ideology would 
ultimately bring the United States and the world the tragedy of total human annihilation. That is to 
say, the United States and the Soviet Union, the two super powers, might engage in nuclear 
exchanges.
  Second, while rejecting the Hobson-Lenin definition of imperialism, Williams came up with a 
new concept of “open door imperialism” or “informal empire” to explain the dynamics of American 
expansionism abroad. Drawing on British historians John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, he 
broadened the meaning of imperialism which had been construed as being synonymous with colo-
nialism. This is one of the significant contributions that Williams made to deepening our under-
standing of expansionism and imperialism in American history.28）
  The third point may perhaps be most important. Williams characterized modern America as 
“the age of corporation capitalism,” insisting that it started from 1882 and continues to the present 
day.29） Previous generations of historians had pursued studies in economic, political, and diplomatic 
histories discretely and dealt with the subject from a narrow, America-centric perspective divorced 
from the rest of the world. Williams, however, introduced a concept of corporate liberalism by 
which he urged historians to think of history as a whole by connecting domestic politics and foreign 
policy together. He also observed that corporate liberalism emphasized such values as productivity, 
rationalization, ef ficiency, cooperation, and coordination. This ideology, he insisted, served 
American leaders as a guide to sustain democracy, prosperity, and social harmony at home, with the 
state playing the role of a “neutral” arbiter of conflicting interests between capital and labor.30） In 
this way, he paved the way for making better sense of the history of modern America. According to 
Williams, corporate liberalism and the American open door policy worked hand in hand. These two 
together constitute social imperialism. The objective of social imperialism is to bring about industri-
al peace and reform at home, on the one hand, and prosperity, general welfare, and peace, on the 
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other, by vigorously pursuing an open door policy abroad. Corporate liberalism, Williams conclud-
ed, is not as liberal as it may appear but, in fact, is essentially conservative and authoritarian.
Responses of Scholars in Japan
  Regardless of the differences in ideological persuasion, many Japanese scholars were attracted 
by Williams’ insightful historical writings. But it is also true that not all scholars necessarily accept-
ed Williams’ methodology and his views of American history without reservations or qualifications.
（1）	Liberal Historians
  The Japanese responses to Williams ranged from a total disregard and/or a flat rejection to 
harsh criticism.
  First, most liberals in Japan found Williams’ views of American history embarrassing and even 
annoying. They either chose not to take up Williams’ challenge directly, or simply ignored his schol-
arship altogether. It was perhaps because liberals wished to think that the Americans had an ability 
to redress social injustices, which was America’s reformist tradition. Most liberals flatly rejected the 
New Left revisionists’ view that new forms of inequality and discrimination were bound to appear 
one after another, as long as America remained in the capitalist world-system. They were not totally 
convinced by Williams’ argument. Instead, they continued to be attracted by the progressive aspects 
of American democracy. In addition, they found new interest in studies in race relations and ethnic 
minorities, as social movements of protest and redress, such as those of civil rights and women’s 
liberation arose in the United States during the 1960’s and the early 1970’s.
  Secondly, other liberals responded equally critically. They harshly criticized Williams’ Tragedy 
of American Diplomacy for a simplistic explanation of American foreign policy.31） They dismissed his 
work as economic determinism tainted by Marxism.32） In fact, however, Williams was neither a 
Marxist nor an economic determinist, even though Williams owed much to the writings of Karl 
Marx. A more careful perusal of Williams’ work might have made it possible for those critics to see 
that Williams was not so. In an ironic way, those liberal scholars showed their superficial reading of 
Williams’ work and perhaps their deep-rooted biases against Marxism.
  Still, another group of liberals, though small in number, handled Williams’ writings seriously by 
taking the bull by the horns, so to speak. A notable example was historian Aruga Tadashi. He 
viewed the history of the United States as the history of national integration and liberal democracy. 
He regretted that those scholars, who were influenced by Williams, tended to present unbalanced 
views of the United States, focusing attention mainly on the shady side of American history. It was 
regrettable, Aruga complained, that such “unsound” state of American studies in Japan would not 
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serve to improve the Japanese image of America, much less to help promote cordial relations be-
tween the two countries.
  Secondly, the ambiguities of the terms that Williams used, such as “empire” and “open door im-
perialism” troubled historian Aruga. Touching the heart of the problem, Aruga criticized Williams 
for overstressing economic factors in decision-making processes of American foreign policy. He was 
equally perturbed by the fact that Williams equated any kind of trade expansion with imperialism.33） 
Aruga insisted that “for a country with an advanced economy, trade expansion is not	（Emphasis is 
the present author’s）	necessarily imperialistic or empire-building.” 34） He went on to state that “two 
expanding economies can often develop interdependence by increasing their mutual trade. Such a 
relationship cannot be considered as empire-building.” 35） In short, Aruga queried what alternative 
for trade expansion there was, if it was as bad as something called imperialism.36）
  It must be noted that what Williams addressed was the problem of the nature of a trade rela-
tionship between predominant America and weak countries — a power relationship that was one-
sided or asymmetrical. Williams once said, “That is the rub of the modern capitalist world economy, 
isn’t it? Imperialism means ‘the loss of sovereign control over essential issues and decisions by less 
developed nations to an industrial metropolis’.” 37）
  Historian Aruga addressed another penetrating problem of Williams’ thesis regarding “the con-
tinuity of U.S. expansionism and imperialism” in American history. He was troubled by the fact that 
Williams equated both Jeffersonian expansionism and that of McKinley’s with imperialism. Even 
though he conceded that the difference did exist between Jeffersonian expansionism and that of 
McKinley,38） Aruga insisted that that difference was nothing but a “quantitative” difference in terms 
of space and commerce. He questioned what “qualitative” difference there was, if any, between the 
expansionisms of the two different periods in question, if both types of expansionism should be un-
derstood as imperialism. If Williams was correct, Aruga queried, “we do not have to call the turn of 
the nineteenth century ‘the age of imperialism,’ the name that historians usually attach to that par-
ticular period in world history, do we?” 39） He regretted that Williams’ indiscriminating use of the 
term expansionism took away historical significance from the period in question. To put it different-
ly, he wondered if Williams thought that U.S. expansionism was/is dictated by the structural imper-
atives of the American capitalist economy, or whether it was simply a reflection of a traditional ex-
pansionist worldview of American policy makers.
The Historians of Orthodox Marxism
  Orthodox Marxist historians welcomed the publication of The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 
which reconfirmed their views of America as a reactionary, imperialist nation. However, they found 
Williams’ methodology of history either problematical or not particularly useful to them.
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  First, Japanese scholars on the left were puzzled by Williams’ silence about the problems of 
“class” and “class struggle” in his description of American history. They were also perplexed by the 
fact that ordinary people, i.e., the working people, hardly appeared in Williams’ book.
  Williams, on the other hand, believed that it was no longer very realistic to expect that the 
working class would play the role as a sole agent for social change, particularly in such an affluent, 
mass society as the United States, the most advanced capitalist nation on earth. Japanese Marxists 
disagreed, however. Moreover, they were unconvinced by Williams’ “unclear” theory of the state 
that was presented in his Contours of American History. It was because those Japanese critics em-
ployed the instrumentalist theory of the state in a monopoly capitalism that the JCP officially 
endorsed. Such criticism leveled at Williams revealed that they belonged to the school of the old left 
in Japan.
  Secondly, they were equally troubled by the fact that Williams placed too much emphasis on 
the role that policy-makers’ ideas and worldviews played in the shaping of American history. 
Japanese scholars on the left criticized such an approach of history as Williams’ for being too elitist 
and ill-suited to their political taste. In this connection, they were annoyed by the fact that Williams 
slighted the importance of structural analysis.
  Thirdly, Japanese Marxists discovered that Williams’ argument regarding the continuity of 
expansionism in American history was neither unique nor very refreshing. Instead, it appeared too 
nationalistic and myopic to them. It was because they saw a certain similarity between American ex-
pansionism and that of Japan. They believed that any capitalist nation must expand in one way or 
another in order to survive in this cut-throat competitive world-system.
  In sum, orthodox Marxists argued that Williams added little to the knowledge that they had 
already acquired from the prevailing version of Marxism in Japan. They thought that his methodol-
ogy was neither helpful nor congenial to their approach to history and their political agenda to bring 
about a socialist revolution. That led them to pay scant attention to Williams and his works thereaf-
ter, perhaps because they were more disposed for historical materialism and also because they did 
not share such a cultural tradition as Christian values and morality. It was unfortunate that they put 
on a blindfold to Williams’ important message, which was idealistic but warm-hearted and humani-
tarian in nature. Consequently, it seemed that Japanese Marxists missed a rare opportunity to learn 
from Williams so that they might be able to write history that has a human face with a warm heart.
  Curiously enough, however, Williams and Japanese orthodox Marxists had one approach to 
history in common. Both Williams and orthodox Marxists studied history from the perspective of 
national development （ikkoku hattenshugi shikan）. It was perhaps because both of them were overly 
anxious to bring about social change at home. Historian Aruga pointed out that the narrowness 
of Williams’ frame of reference was one of the serious shortcomings from which The Tragedy of 
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American Diplomacy suffered. He remarked that Williams’ perspective excluded from consideration 
the structure of the international system as an important determinant of American foreign policy.40） 
Aruga regretted that such a narrow perspective as Williams’ made it difficult to adequately explain 
the complexity of the origins of the Cold War and the reasons for its prolongation. Besides, he noted 
that Williams overemphasized American power and its freedom of action in the world arena and 
portrayed the United States as an almighty player projecting its preponderant prowess unilaterally 
onto the rest of the world. Such a portrayal distorted the reality of American diplomacy and gave 
readers a false image on omnipotent America, Aruga complained. Moreover, Aruga charged that 
Williams failed to examine a variety of oppositional forces at work abroad which worked not only to 
constrain America’s freedom of action, but also may have affected American society at home signifi-
cantly. It was argued that those problems primarily derived from Williams’ narrow perspective.
（2） Japanese New Left Historians41）
  As noted earlier, historian Shimizu Tomohisa introduced Williams to his Japanese colleagues 
immediately after he returned from study at the University of Wisconsin in 1960−1961. He took the 
view that American aggression in Vietnam was nothing but an inevitable consequence of the 
American past.42） He was opposed to the Vietnam War and his government that supported U.S. war 
efforts in Southeast Asia.43）  Shimizu was actively involved in an anti-war, pro-peace movement in 
Japan, while at the same time he pursued American studies. He was determined not to become an 
“armchair scholar,” cloistering himself in an ivory tower.44） He chose to distance himself from both 
mainstream liberals and orthodox Marxists in Japan.
  Obviously Shimizu respected his mentor deeply whom he regarded as a historian of great intel-
lectual insight as he acknowledged his intellectual debt to Williams.45） Shimizu published his 
Amerika teikoku （The American Empire） in 1968.46）
  In this thought-provoking book, he insisted that the history of the United States should be un-
derstood as the history of an empire. First, Shimizu posited that modernity had two faces — one 
was radiant and forward-looking, while the other was dark and seamy. The former, he argued, rep-
resented positive values such as liberty, freedom, and individualism, while the latter, negative ones, 
such as exclusivity, discrimination, and exploitation.47） He also posited that modern society of any 
nation established itself, grew, and came to maturity by exploiting other societies and nations. 
Based on these premises, he described the shady aspects of U.S. history, such as racism, discrimi-
nation against minorities, and disparities based on an unequal distribution of wealth. It is notewor-
thy that Shimizu hardly employed Marxian concepts like class and class struggle in his historical 
analysis, nor did he necessarily regard the working class as a sole agent for social change. He chal-
lenged his Japanese peers to reexamine the American past by looking at it from the bottom-up.48）
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  Secondly, Shimizu put forth the continuity thesis of expansionism in American history. He 
argued that U.S. expansionism had started since the days of the Founding Fathers, such as George 
Washington and Thomas Jefferson and that it still continues to the present day. It is important to 
note that the difference that Shimizu did see in expansionism between the pre-imperialist years and 
the post-imperialist days was its “quantity” aspect. In other words, when he analyzed U.S. expansion-
ism, he hardly discussed the subject matter in the context of neither the changing economic struc-
ture, nor of the growing power of the state in American history.49）
  Takahashi Akira, another Japanese historian on the left shared Shimizu’s continuity thesis of 
U.S. expansionism, while he also took the view that the history of the United Sates was the history 
of an empire. In 1968 and 1969, he published two articles that illuminated the characteristics of 
American imperialism of the turn of the nineteenth century.50） Drawing on the Hobson-Lenin para-
digm of imperialism and Williams’ concepts of “open door imperialism” and “informal empire,” 
Takahashi argued that U.S. economic expansionism was dictated by the structural imperatives of 
American monopoly capitalism that matured at the turn of the nineteenth century. He recognized a 
“qualitative” difference between territorial expansionism on the North American continent and eco-
nomic expansionism abroad in the twentieth century.
  Historian Takahashi took Aruga’s scathing criticism of Williams’ continuity thesis of expansion-
ism seriously. He attempted to incorporate Williams’ idea of open-door imperialism into the Hobson-
Lenin paradigm of imperialism in a coherent way, but he was not very successful. He found the con-
ceptual shortcomings of Hobson-Lenin and Williams inherent in their narrow historical perspectives 
of national development. In particular, he realized that the Hobson-Lenin definition of imperialism 
was too constraining in terms of a time-frame and too economically deterministic. Takahashi started 
looking for a new frame of reference, the one that was entirely different from the old Hobson-Lenin 
and Williams’ paradigm.
  Interestingly enough, Takahashi’s gradual change in his conceptualization of imperialism 
coincided with the publication of Thomas McCormick’s essay on “a corporatist synthesis for 
American diplomatic history” and his subsequent ‘think piece’ on “world systems.”51） Apparently 
both Takahashi and McCormick were stimulated by the works of social scientists, such as Andre 
Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Immanuel Wallerstein, and others.52）
  To make better sense of American overseas expansionism, Takahashi came to realize that it 
was important to analyze the subject matter by placing it in the context of world capitalism. In his 
subsequent studies, he employed a world-systems perspective that had been developed by scholars, 
such as Fernand Braudel, French historian, and Wallerstein, American historical sociologist.
  Wallerstein challenged the Hobson-Lenin paradigm of imperialism frontally. He maintained that 
imperialism was NOT （Capital letters are the present author’s.） the historical phenomenon that 
Cultural Cold War in Japan 27
could be found only at the highest stage of capitalism, as Hobson and Lenin had insisted. Instead, 
he argued that it was the phenomenon that came to surface periodically and that it reflected the 
business cycles in the capitalist world-economy. He maintained that imperialism recurred cyclically 
since the sixteenth century during which the age of “modern world-system” had dawned.53） 
Standing on that premise, the American historical sociologist defined imperialism as nothing but 
“activities of a stronger nation toward weaker states.”54） In Wallerstein’s view, imperialism was 
synonymous with such terms as “capitalism and development.” Historian Takahashi seemed to be 
persuaded by him.55）
  Historian Takahashi analyzed American foreign relations by employing the concept of hegemo-
ny and the ideas of “cyclical rhythms” and “secular trends” that Wallerstein had developed. Positing 
that “the age of imperialism” was “the B-phase of stagnation” of the capitalist world-economy, 
Takahashi insisted that U.S. imperialism of the 1890’s could better be understood as being the 
American version of a neo-mercantilist, state-interventionist policy. He contended that American 
imperialism of the turn of the nineteenth century was the early manifestation of U.S. hegemonic as-
piration to replace Great Britain. Finally, Takahashi came to firm grips with the issue of American 
imperialism. He gave new life to his studies of American diplomatic history.
  As noted earlier, while Shimizu was a non-Marxist radical modernist, Takahashi started his 
career as an orthodox Marxist and became a world-systems analyst in the second half of his career. 
Shimizu explored a possibility of establishing an egalitarian, more humane community in Japan by 
remolding people’s social consciousness through the democratic process of a representative gov-
ernment. On the other hand, Takahashi regarded social inequality and injustice as the manifestation 
of the contradictions inherent in a capitalist system. He fought against imperialism so as to bring 
about a socialist revolution at home.56） Notwithstanding the differences in their ideological and his-
torical orientation, Shimuzu and Takahashi contributed much to an understanding of Williams’ 
works during the 1970’s and beyond.57）
Conclusion
  The foregoing discussion made it clear that the impact of Williams’ scholarship on Japanese 
scholars of American studies was dramatic but limited. But his methodology of American history 
was not the only factor that was responsible for the limited effect.
  First, Williams faced tough competition in spreading influence in Japan. Japanese scholars who 
leaned toward Marxism found attraction in the works of Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, in particular. 
They discovered that Kolko’s work corresponded well with their version of Marxism, because 
Gabriel Kolko employed not only a structural but also systemic approach to the study of American 
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foreign policy and American capitalism.58） In addition, Williams competed with other American 
scholars, such as those who were associated with the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars 
（CCAS）	throughout the 1960’s and the 1970’s.59）
  Secondly, the end of the Vietnam War and the meteoric rise of trans-nationalism and globaliza-
tion contributed to reducing the attractiveness of Williams’ methodology of history and his writings. 
The conclusion of the Vietnam War served to deprive leftist historians of a concrete reason to criti-
cize U.S. foreign policy. At the same time, the advancement of trans-nationalism and globalization 
made Williams’ America-centric perspective of diplomatic history look less useful and much less ap-
pealing to many Japanese scholars of international relations.
  Thirdly, the introduction of Williams’ philosophy of history to Japan coincided with the rise of 
nationalism and conservatism that was occasioned by its spectacular economic growth. The 
Japanese public, particularly liberal intellectuals realized intuitively that Williams’ writing did not 
provide them with what they were looking for, namely, psychological serenity and tranquility. By the 
time Williams was introduced to Japan, the Japanese public seemed to have grown weary of the 
kind of social change that the majority of the 1960’s slogans represented, and they were tired of the 
stress and alienation that they had gone through since the end of the war. Thus, they turned inward-
looking and self-complacent. They spent much time in discussing such topics as “the uniqueness of 
the Japanese” and celebrated the cultural and economic accomplishments that their ancestors had 
made as well as those of their own.
  Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the uninterrupted influx of literature relating to differ-
ent sub-fields other than diplomatic history was responsible for neutralizing the impact of Williams 
and American New Left revisionism in Japan. An increasing number of scholars of American studies 
found attraction in the historical writings of the French Annales School, the new social history, and 
women’s history that came back into vogue in America during the 1970’s and the 1980’s. For those 
scholars, Williams’ scholarship appeared elitist, America-centered, and too detached from the 
women’s movement, （and their plea for liberation）	 if not entirely sexist. Female scholars and a 
younger generation of American experts, in particular, found feminist history and the new social 
history more refreshing and interesting.
  In spite of all this, however, Williams was a unique historian of keen insight, critical mind, and a 
warm heart; he made a significant impact on Japanese scholars of American foreign relations.60） He 
and other New Left revisionists, notably Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber, and Thomas McCormick, 
inspired great interest in American foreign policy and stimulated Japanese scholars to examine em-
pirically some of the hypotheses that Williams formulated in his Tragedy of American Diplomacy — 
such hypotheses as “empire has limits” and “empire does not pay.”
  Under those circumstances, a small study group called Amerikashi Kenkyu¯kai （The Society of 
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American Historical Studies）	was formed in 1975 with a membership of 20. The critical situation 
outside Japan, namely, the protest movements that had started in France, the United States, and 
elsewhere since the 1960’s and the influence of American New Left revisionism prompted them to 
form this anti-establishmentarian organization.61） This new group of younger scholars announced 
that one of the primary purposes of organizing the new study group was to critically reexamine the 
conventional views of America and seek to rewrite a whole history of the United States from entirely 
new perspectives. This organization published the first issue of its journal in 1978, featuring the 
problems of the State in American history.62） With a rapid increase in membership after more than 
thirty years since its inception, this study group reorganized itself anew with the new name of 
Nihon Amerikashi Gakkai （The Japanese Association for American History）	 in September 2004. 
The younger organization of American history, which perhaps may be regarded as a living testimo-
ny of the influence of New Left revisionism, has been active and thriving up to the present day. It 
stands side by side with more traditional Nihon Amerika Gakkai （The Japanese Association for 
American Studies）.63） For this reason alone, it might be properly stated that Williams and American 
New Left revisionists contributed much to promoting American studies in Japan.
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Tokyo daigaku Amerika kenkyu¯ shiryo¯ sentâ nenpo¯, 9 （1986）, pp. 122‒126; Uesugi Shinobu, 
“Amerikashi kenkyu¯kai so¯ritsu nijyu¯ shu¯nen wo mukaete” 〔Celebrating the 20th Anniversary of the 
Formation of The Society of American Historical Studies〕, Amerikashi-kenkyu¯, 10 （1987）, pp. 56‒60; 
Akimoto Eiichi, “Amerikashi kenkyu¯kai”, Tokyo daigaku Amerika kenkyu¯ shiryo¯ sentâ nenpo¯, 11 
（1988）, pp. 89‒92; Tomita Torao et al., Amerikashi-kenkyu¯, 18 （1995）.
62） Younger Japanese scholars of American history criticized Williams for his lacking a structural ap-
proach, pointing to the fact that he was weak in his theory of the state, although they all acknowl-
edged the fact that Williams was an outstanding scholar of insight and imagination. In his attempt to 
gain the knowledge of the state in modern America, one scholar chose to review the books in which 
Gabriel Kolko and Robert Wiebe outlined the theory of the state. It is interesting to note, however, 
that Williams was conspicuously absent in that review. Amerikashi kenkyu¯kai, ed., Amerikashi-kenkyu¯ 
〔Studies of American History〕, 1 （1978）. 
63） For the critical reviews of the studies of American history in Japan, see the brilliant articles by Shirai 
Yo¯ko, Nakano Hirofumi, and Umezaki To¯ru that appeared in The Japanese Association for American 
History, ed., Amerikashi kenkyu¯, 30 （2007）.
